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A. W. MARSHALL AND W. H. MECKLING
THE RAND CORPORATION
NOWADAYS, tales of how important discoveries or inventions have
been made by accident or in contradiction to the best scientific evalu-
ation are familiar to almost everyone. And the proposition that devel-
opment of new products or processes is an uncertain business is
generally accepted without serious dispute. But when it comes to
translating this generality into uncertainties associated with particular
current development proposals, or when it comes to discussing the
implications of uncertainty for the way development projects should
be managed, the apparent agreement in point of view is often quickly
dissipated. To a large extent the differences that arise do so over the
question of the extent of the uncertainty in development—over
questions like, Are estimates of cost of production likely to be off by
25 per cent or by 300 per cent?
In its role as advisor to the Air Force on research and development
policies RAND is continually forced to make use of predictions about
particular development projects. Inevitably, we have become con-
cerned over the confidence that can be attached to such predictions.
In this paper we present the results of some recent research into the
extent and nature of the uncertainty in new developments. Our general
conclusions are:
1. Early estimates of important parameters are usually quite
inaccurate, in two respects. First, such estimates are strongly biased
toward overoptimism. Second, aside from the bias, the errors in esti-
mates show a substantial variation. That is, even if estimates are multi-
plied by an appropriate standard factor to eliminate the bias, a non-
negligible source of error remains.
2. The accuracy of estimates is a function of the stage of develop-
ment, i.e., estimates improve as development of the item progresses.
This also means that estimates for development projects representing
NOTE: The authors are greatly indebted to Eugene Brussell for his pioneering research
on the accuracy of cost estimates, and to Robert Summers for expanding Brussell's work
and providing penetrating comments.
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only "modest advances" tend to be better than those for more ambi-
tious projects.
We hope in the balance of this paper to make these propositions
more meaningful through analysis and discussion as well as presenta-
tion of some data.
One word of warning is perhaps in order. Most of our experience has
been limited to military development (the Air Force in particular)
and what we have to say is largely centered about the problems of
development in that area. Although we feel our experience does have
relevance to the problems of development generally, we are by no
means confident that it applies with equal exactness in all areas. There
are some good reasons for believing that privately financed projects
may show different tendencies. In our data, estimates of cost of pro-
duction of the type of equipment most closely resembling regular
commercial equipment, i.e., cargo and tanker aircraft, appear to be
quite accurate. This is probably partly because of the modest advances
usually sought in these programs, and partly it is because for some of
these there are commercially available substitutes.' There are, of course,
many reasons why military development programs are likely to differ
from ordinary commercial ventures. Military developments tend to
explore very near the margin of technical feasibility; commercial
development goes only so far as market profitability. The policy of cost-
plus contracting followed in most military projects is not common
practice in private developments. Under cost-plus contracting there is
very little penalty attached to understating costs, hence contractors
have a decided incentive to do so in order to get contracts. The ten-
dency to underestimate costs is, therefore, not very surprising in
military development.
The term research and development covers a wide spectrum of
human activity ranging from the discovery of new principles to the
construction and testing of operational equipment like a commercial
aircraft that itself embodies very little that is really new and untried.
In this paper we shall not attempt to cover this entire spectrum.
Instead we shall focus on what might be called operational develop-
ment as distinguished from basic research and exploratory develop-
ment. By the former we mean, roughly, the effort to take ideas or
components that have been tested experimentally and embody them
1Thislatter condition leads to a selective process and since we only observe the
development of military cargo aircraft that are roughly competitive with commercial
carriers no large factor increases in cost estimates from early to late estimates are found.
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in useful equipment, as distinguished from the generation of new ideas
and their experimental testing. The development of the first jet engine
and of the transistor are examples of the latter, while the develop-
ment of a jet aircraft or a transistorized bombing-navigation system
are examples of operational development. Although this division is
crude, it defines the area of discussion sufficiently for our purposes.2
Ultimately, the measure of success of any development project is
the difference between costs and the value of output. But predictions
regarding particular projects are seldom framed in terms of that
criterion. Instead they take the form of estimates of separate ingredi-
ents of success such as costs, performance, etc.
To discuss predictability rationally then, we need an exhaustive
classification of factors that affect success. One such classification
that we have found useful consists of four subclasses: (1) costs (devel-
opment and production); (2) performance;3 (3) time of availability;4
(4) utility.
Utility
Because the first three factors are largely quantitive5 while the last,
utility, is largely qualitative, most of our study of the problem of
predictability has centered about the first three, and we shall concen-
trate on them here. But, in a paper purporting to discuss how well we
can foresee the outcome of research and development, it would be a
serious error of omission to neglect entirely uncertainties about utility.
This is particularly true of the development of military equipment.
The utility of a potential weapon system usually depends on a host of
circumstances about which there is great uncertainty. What weapon
systems will the enemy have? What kinds of war or wars will it be
necessary to be prepared to fight, and where? What will happen to
political alliances in the future? What competing or complementary
weapons will be developed? And more could be asked. The outcome
2Thisrestriction on the subject matter is not imposed because basic research and
exploratory development are less uncertain than operational development. In fact, an
imposing list of examples where the best experts failed to foresee the potential of new
ideas could be constructed. It is simply a matter of keeping the size of the problem within
reasonable bounds.
Performance is used here very broadly to include all the qualities of any equipment or
system that contribute to its utility. For military equipment the kinds of qualities included
are speed, range, accuracy, pay load, maintainability, operability, etc.
Realistically, availability consists of a schedule of quantities available through time,
though we shall consider here only the first operational availability.
This statement is qualified because certain aspects of performance, like ease of
handling, are not quantitative.
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of a particular development can, and frequently does, hinge critically
on answers to questions of this sort. Thus, ten years ago we did not
foresee the rapid development of nuclear warheads by the Soviet and
its concomitant strides in ballistic missiles. In fact we did not foresee
our own development of hydrogen warheads and the implications of
this for the utility of ballistic missiles. But these developments had a
tremendous impact on the utility of other weapons such as air-
breathing intercontinental missiles that we were then intent on devel-
oping. In other instances we have tended to overestimate the quantity
or quality, or both, of enemy weapons. During the Taiwan air battle
we were pleasantly surprised by the overwhelming superiority of the
weapon systems we had supplied to the Nationalists. In short, although
it is difficult to quantify uncertainties about the utility of proposed
developments, there is no doubt that they exist and are highly signifi-
cant.
The Equivocal Nature of Predictions
One of the main difficulties encountered in assessing the accuracy of
development predictions is the fact that the predictions themselves are
seldom formulated in a way that permits verification. Perhaps the most
obvious (and most pernicious) example of this is the oft-repeated
statement that something is "technically feasible" or "within the
state of the art." The "something" referred to is usually a set of per-
formance characteristics for equipment whose development is under
consideration. Depending on the interpretation one supplies, asser-
tions like these are generally either useless or irrefutable. If they are
intended to mean only that such performance is physically possible,
they are quite useless in deciding whether a particular development
project deserves support. Since proposed developments seldom violate
physical laws, at some time and at some cost the advertised perform-
ance can almost always be achieved. On the other hand, if they are
intended to mean more than that—that such performance is attain-
able at an "interesting" cost and in an "interesting" time period—
they are irrefutable until costs and availability are explicitly quantified.
It is of course the latter meaning that is ordinarily conveyed, whether
it is intended or not, and that meaning provides a kind of ideal pro-
totype illustrating the source of much of the difficulty encountered in
measuring the accuracy of development predictions.
In our classification of factors affecting the success of a develop-
ment program, we listed (aside from utility) three parameters or classes
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of parameters—costs, performance, and time. In practice, trade-offs
among these three are always possible. There is a production surface
relating them. A given performance can be attained earlier if greater
costs are incurred; or, for given costs, earlier availability is possible
if lower performance is accepted, and so on. The relevance of these
trade-offs to development prediction is fairly obvious. Predictions of
any one parameter, e.g., performance, that do not specify what is
assumed about the other two, are very elusive propositions indeed.
For the predicted parameter may always be achieved at the sacrifice of
either or both of the other two.
Cost Estimates
One variant of this kind of ambiguity that is particularly troublesome
is the standard procedure for estimating costs. When early estimates
are made of what it will cost to produce or develop something new,
the estimator typically bases his estimate on the current design and the
currently planned program for development. If he is estimating cost of
production, he gets a total cost by costing the various components as
presently conceived and aggregating those. If he is estimating the cost of
development, he estimates the cost of test articles, engineering man-
hours, etc., as presently planned and aggregates those. He does not
specify what performance he is associating with the particular design
nor does he indicate the date at which that performance is to be
operationally available. He is simply costing a physical configura-
tion or the physical resources contemplated in the current develop-
ment plan, or both.
As development proceeds, however, these initial designs and plans
are almost invariably changed, either because of unforeseen technical
difficulties that forestall meeting performance requirements, or be-
cause the customer decides it is essential that the equipment be modi-
fied so as to keep pace with changing predictions of enemy capabili-
ties, new operational concepts, and new technological possibilities.
A guidance system that was supposed to weigh a few hundred pounds
turns out to weigh a ton; a development program that was supposed
to require fifteen test articles requires forty-five; revised estimates of
enemy defense capabilities dictate additional pay load in the form of
countermeasure gear; and more. This kind of thing is not the excep-
tion, but the rule. Such changes will have an important effect on
costs, and the costs finally incurred will not be those of the initial
design or the initial development program, but the cost of whatever
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actually is produced and whatever program actually is conducted.
The difficulties this poses for verifying original estimates are obvious.
If costs turn out to differ materially from original predictions, the
estimator absolves himself on the grounds that he costed a different
program or different product; and, since the initial program or pro-
duct never, emerges, it is usually not possible to know exactly what
it would have cost.
In fact, however, absolution is not as simple as all that. The purpose
of such cost estimates is to foster a better allocation of resources to
research and development projects. Our interest in estimating costs
emanates from our desire to economize by making better research
and development decisions. In that context we are not concerned with
what it would cost to construct particular physical configurations or
to carry out particular plans. Instead, we are interested in what it will
cost to get some level (or levels) of performance by some date (or
dates). Suppose, for example, we are trying to decide whether to initiate
the development of a new missile. An analysis of the potential of the
missile must run in terms of the performance characteristics of the
missile—range, pay load, vulnerability, reliability, etc..—attainable in
a certain time period. Accordingly, it is the cost corresponding to the
assumed level of performance that is relevant to making the decision,
not the cost of a particular development program and a particular
physical configuration.
In practice, estimates of the cost of particular development pro-
grams and physical configurations are universally married to particu-
lar performance characteristics in analyses directed toward making
development decisions. In other words, such estimates are used as if
they were in fact estimates of the cost of achieving the expected level
of performance.6 As a practical matter, therefore, it is appropriate to
treat cost estimates, however they are generated, as if they were esti-
mates of the cost of achieving the expected levels of performance by
a given date. By so doing and by observing the changes in these esti-
mates we have a measure of the uncertainty actually confronted in
making research and development decisions.
In principle it would be possible to factor the total error in cost
estimates as they are prepared into two parts: (1) the part due to
errors in the costing of the configuration supplied to the cost estima-
tor (i.e. the intrinsic error in cost estimating); and (2) the part due to
6Moreover,this is generally done with the active support of those who generate the
cost estimates!
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changes in the configuration as development progresses. In practice
it has not been possible to carry out this separation. However, it is
our belief that the intrinsic errors in costing a fixed configuration tend
to be small relative to errors due to changes in the configuration in
the costing of most major items of military equipment. This means
that the main improvements in the accuracy of cost estimating,
especially for items of equipment or weapon systems embodying
moderate or large changes in technology, must be sought in improved
forecasts of the final configurations or other statistical means of
adjusting early estimates. However, large uncertainties will remain for
these estimates in any case, and those uncertainties should be taken
into account in their use. Perhaps estimates should be presented in
such a way as to make this possible. As estimates are now produced,
the results show this would involve at least adding to each estimate
an estimate of its bias and mean square error. Ideally it would involve
supplying the user with a complete set of sufficient statistics.
Turning now to the data, Table 1 summarizes some data on the
history of estimates of cost of production7 for twenty-two major items
of military equipment.8 For each item of equipment we have calculated
TABLE 1





1 5.6 1 8.7 1 1.7 1 57.6
2 3.6 2 3.5 2 1.6 2 20.7
3 3.1 3 1.5 3 1.0 3 11.1
4 2.1 4 1.0 4 10.3
5 1.9 5 1.5




Mean 2.4 4.5 1.3 17.1 (9.0)a
Mean, allclasses 6.5(4.1)G
Note: Factor is the ratio of the latest available estimate to the earliest available
estimate.
Excluding missile case No. 1.
Not including the cost of development.
8Thesestudies of the accuracy of estimates of cost of production of military equipment
are mainly the work of Eugene R. Brussell. We are particularly indebted to him since, so
far as we know, his work is the only systematic attempt to study this problem.
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the ratio of the latest available estimate of the cumulative average
cost of production to the earliest such estimate available.9 That ratio
is labeled factor in Table 1. Thus if the latest cost estimate were three
times the earliest available estimate, the factor would be three. Table 1
shows these factors for four classes of equipment—fighters, bombers,
cargoes and tankers, and missiles. (This breakdown simply follows
conventional military lines, but it is useful because, as we shall see
later, the technical advance incorporated in new equipment correlates
fairly well with this classification system.)
The ratio between the most recent estimate and the earliest esti-
mate of the cost of production for these items ranges from a minimum
of ito a maximum of 57.Ifwe include the extreme missile case, num-
ber 1, the over-all mean factor increase is about 6.5; if we exclude it,
the mean increase is roughly 4. It is worth noting that there exist
substantial differences in the means among the four classes of equip-
ment. For cargoes and tankers the mean factor was only 1.3, while
for missiles it was 17.'°
The factors presented in Table 1 are unadjusted. In particular, no
adjustment has been made for changes in price levels, and no adjust-
ment has been made for disparities between actual output and the out-
put contemplated at the time the early estimates were made. Both of
these adjustments tend to reduce the factors, i.e., reduce the size of the
estimating error. Since changes in price levels have generally been
upward, the factors are reduced when the latest estimates are deflated.
At the same time experience indicates (at least for the kinds of military
equipment considered here) that cumulative average cost of produc-
tion is a decreasing function of total output. In practice, total output
The data Brussell was able to get are particularly messy. Therefore, a good deal of
judgment has had to go into the construction of these estimates of factor increases. But
even after the most prudent treatment, the data from which the factors were generated
leave much to be desired and a good deal of caution is needed in interpreting the results.
The earliest estimate available for some systems was made later in development than for
other systems. In some cases the latest available data were actual data on cost of pro-
duction. In other cases, the latest available data were still estimates either because a
program was cancelled or because development was incomplete. Sometimes it was not
possible to determine just what the original estimator had included in his estimate in the
way of subsystems, spares, etc. If the error in the cost estimates was generally small, e.g.
25 per cent, these deficiencies might be important. In fact, however, the error tends to be
so large that the defects in the data are not too troublesome. In addition, on balance, the
data were dealt with in such a way that these estimates are, if off in one direction or
another, likely to understate the factor increases.
10Thevehicles included in the six missile cases represent a much more heterogeneous
assortment than for the other three classes of equipment. At least one of each of the
following is included among the six: air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air-to-
surface missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles.
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usually turns out to be much smaller than is originally anticipated to
a large extent because costs turn out to be greater than anticipated.
Therefore, when the original estimate is adjusted to take account of
the reduced output, the effect is almost always to reduce the factor.
Strictly speaking, the unadjusted factors in Table 1 overstate the
magnitude of the error in cost estimates. Why do we then bother to
include Table 1? First, because a comparison of Table 1 and Table 2
provides an indication of the impact of the output and quantity
adjustments. But second, and more importantly, because decisions
are sometimes made with little or no appreciation of the functional
relationship between costs and outputs. For example, system A, that
is now under development, is estimated to cost $X million per copy
based on some output, Thereafterwhen system A comes up for
consideration its cost is taken to be $X million without regard to out-
put. Thus, even though the cost estimator is thinking in terms of a
schedule of average costs associated with appropriate outputs, a
single point on that schedule is sometimes the cornerstone for a
decision.
Table 2 presents adjusted factors for the same twenty-two items of
TABLE 2


























































Mean, all classes 3.22.4
3.42.7 1.21.2 6.44.1
equipment. The adjustment is twofold to take account of the two prob-
lems discussed above. First, an aircraft composite price index was
used to deflate the latest cost estimates. Second, in each case the factor
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was adjusted to take account of any difference between the output on
which the early estimate was based and the output on which the most
recent estimate is based.
You will note that Table 2 contains not one but two sets of adjusted
factors. We have elected to show two sets because of the tricky
nature of the adjustment process. Discretion and judgment are called
for in deciding what adjustments are most sensible. The two sets of
factors in Table 2 were prepared by two different individuals," and
represent somewhat independent judgments as to what is appropriate.
Both proceed essentially from the same unadjusted data, however.
As is evident from Table 2, the effect of the adjustments is to reduce
the size of the factors. The mean factor for all twenty-two items is
about cut in half, to 3.2 for the A set of factors and to 2.4 for the B set
of factors. For the missile class as a whole, the mean factor is cut by
about 2/3 or 3/4, depending on which set of factors is used. Most of
the reduction incidentally is a result of the output adjustment rather
than of the price level adjustment. For the twenty-two systems the
price level increase from the date of the earliest estimate to the date
of the most recent estimate ranged from 3 per cent to 52 per cent and
averaged only 28 per cent.
The data in Table 1 and in Table 2 are consistent with the two main
propositions made at the beginning of this paper. The cost estimates
for these twenty-two items of equipment were decidedly biased to-
ward overoptimism. Even after the adjustments, the most recent esti-
mates on the average exceeded the earliest available estimates by some
240 to 300 per cent. Moreover, among the various items of equipment
there were substantial differences in the size of the increase, ranging
from slight decreases in some instances to factors of 6 or 7, using even
the most modest set of factors.
The difference in the mean size of the factor among the different
classes of equipment is also revealing. The smallest increase on the
average occurred in the cargo and tanker class, while the largest in-
crease occurred in the missile class. The explanation for this lies in
our second main proposition to the effect that the size of the error in
estimates is a function of the stage of development or the magnitude
of the advance being sought. The performance demanded of new cargo
and tanker aircraft, such as range, speed, and even sometimes pay
load, is usually less than what has already been achieved in other air-
Oneset of factors was computed by Eugene R. Brussell, the other set by Robert
Summers.
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craft, particularly bombers. Moreover, the subsystems that together
make up the air vehicle as a rule are "off-the-shelf" items. The engines,
for example, are likely to have already been in operation for some time
in other aircraft. Even the airframe is often only a slight modification
of some design already in use. In brief, in terms of both performance
and physical characteristics of the equipment, only very modest inno-
vations are embodied in cargo and tanker developments. Very likely,
the costing errors in these cases are almost totally due to the first of the
two sources of error mentioned earlier. The factors for cargo and
tanker aircraft probably represent an upper bound on the currently
attainable level of accuracy in cost estimating.
At the other extreme, during the period covered by most of these
estimates, missile development encompassed what was in many re-
spects a new and radically different technology. Computers and other
electronic equipment were required capable of solving complex
guidance and control problems without the aid of man in the vehicle,
and many of the missiles incorporated propulsion systems with which
there had been little previous experience. Meanwhile performance was
demanded that meant an order of magnitude improvement over any-
thing we had achieved before.
In other words, the technology and the performance which charac-
terize the missile programs of Table 1 and Table 2 called not for the
kind of modest advances sought in cargo and tanker programs but
for quite ambitious advances. This, we think, is the reason for the
much larger bias and the larger variance exhibited by the missile
estimates. Factor increases for cost estimates associated with a second
generation of missile systems are likely to be nearer those shown for
fighter and bomber aircraft.'2
Further evidence on the same point is presented in Table 3. Tech-
nical experts were asked to classify our twenty-two development pro-
grams according to the technical advance sought in each—small,
medium, or large. The consensus of that poll was then used to classify
the factors as shown in Table 3. The results evidence a correlation be-
tween factor size and the size of the advance being sought—the mean
factor being an increasing function of the size of advance.'3
12Thoughthe subject is not covered here, we have also compared predicted and actual
development costs and found much the same story as for production costs. Actual costs
generally prove to be much higher than originally anticipated, with a large variance in the
error from one project to another.
The relationship is even stronger if the effect of a third variable, namely the date of
the estimates, is removed. Among the systems that represented large advances, the first
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TABLE 3




















































Mean1.3 1.4 1.8 1.7 5.0 3.4
A vailability Predictions
As we have indicated above, time, or how long a development will
take, is another important parameter in predicting the outcome of
development programs. This is particularly true of military develop-
ments where each side struggles frantically to achieve technological
superiority in its weapons.
Availability predictions, like cost predictions, exhibit both a
decided bias toward overoptimism and substantial variation in the
extent of the optimism. Table 4 gives the "slippage" in years for ten
of the twenty-two systems covered in Tables 1 and 2, along with slip-
page factors.'4 Slippage is here defined as the difference between early
estimates of first operational dates and actual first operational dates.
The slippage factors are the counterpart of our cost factors. They are
the ratio of actual time taken to get systems into operation to early
predictions of the time it would take to make them operational. Data
on availability is also often treacherous, requiring careful auditing and
interpretation. Determining when a system actually became operation-
al is a case in point. New equipment in the hands of the operating
commands does not mean that an operational capability has been
achieved. Which of several early estimates should be used is also
frequently a problem. In general, for the systems in Table 4 we have
three were cases in which the earliest cost estimates available were, nevertheless, made
fairly late in the program. They are thus based on much better information than was
generally the case. For that reason the resulting factors were relatively small.
Data on all twenty-two systems are not available.



















used conservative dates—dates that make the error in estimated
availability as small as is reasonably possible.
In spite of this, the errors in estimates of availability dates for
those ten systems average 2 years and range as high as 5 years, while
the factors range as high as 2.5 and average 1.5. Other studies of
slippages, covering a much larger number of systems, tend to confirm
the results of Table 4. Estimates of availability are almost invariably
optimistic, with the error in estimates varying widely from one
weapon system to another.'5
Finally, it is worth noting that, like cost estimates, availability
estimates tend to be more accurate the less ambitious the particular
project and, of course, tend to be more accurate in the later stages of
development than they are in the early stages.
Performance Predictions
The last important measure of success to be considered is performance.
Availability and costs each could be expressed in terms of a single
vector, time and dollars respectively. Performance, however, cannot
be reduced to a single vector. Performance consists of a multitude of
15Inconnection with slippages a word is in order on so-called program stretch-outs.
Sometimes program plans are revised and operational dates postponed because of
insufficient development funds. But there are two variants of this. There is the case where
development expenditures are held to levels below what was anticipated when initial plans
were laid, and there is the case where development expenditures, although constrained,
are nonetheless as large or larger than was initially planned. To call the latter a stretch-out
is, at the very least, misleading. And as a matter of fact the former occurs only infrequently.
None of the ten systems here were stretched-out in that sense.
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attributes—range, speed, altitude, reliability, maintainability, vulner-
ability, operability, accuracy, etc. Most of these can be quantified, but
others are largely qualitative, e.g., ease of handling. It will be neces-
sary, therefore, to treat estimates of performance much more broadly
than estimates of cost and availability.
Estimates of performance also differ from estimates of cost and
availability in another important respect. Typically, in weapons
development great emphasis is placed on performance. Most new
weapons are developed around specific detailed performance require-
ments laid down by the military—requirements that are taken very
seriously. The penalties incurred by contractors for not meeting per-
formance requirements are more severe than those for failure to meet
availability schedules or failure to live within original cost estimates.
As a result, whenever circumstances dictate a retreat from early
plans, it is usually the costs or availability, or both, that give ground.
If, for example, technological difficulties with electronic equipment
prohibit the attainment of the required performance on the original
schedule at original costs, usually either the availability date is post-
poned, or costs are increased, or both. Degradations in performance
are seldom tolerated.
This means that estimates of performance tend to be realized to a
greater degree than estimates of either costs or availability. However,
among the twenty-two systems in Table 1, most fell short of perform-
ance expectations in one or more respects. Range or accuracy was
sometimes less than expected. More often than not, reliability was
poorer than expected. But the amount by which performance fell
short was usually small in comparison to the extension of time or
the increase in costs that occurred. Moreover, in some instances per-
formance actually turned out to be somewhat better than expected.
In short, though estimates of performance tend to be slightly higher
than what is finally achieved, they are much more nearly fulfilled
than are predictions of cost and availability.
Summary
The data presented above are neither as comprehensive nor as unam-
biguous as one would like. Nevertheless, they do give a reasonably
accurate picture of recent experience with predicting the outcome of
development projects. The truth is that estimates have been quite
inaccurate. Cost iiicreases on the order of 200 to 300 per cent and
extensions of development time by 1/3 to 1/2 are not the exception,
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but the rule. In addition, the size of the error in estimates has varied
widely from one weapon to another.
The optimistic bias is not hard to understand. Contractors are
anxious to have their proposals accepted by the military, and the
military itself is anxious to have proposals supported
by the Department of Defense and Congress. The incentive to make
optimistic estimates is thus very strong. On the other hand, the con-
tractual penalties for having been overoptimistic are generally small.
But apart from any bias, the military have been living for the last
decade or so, and will continue to live for the foreseeable future, in a
period of unprecedented technological revolution. Therefore there
have been great uncertainties involved in all of their planning and
perhaps especially in the R and D area. Errors were bound to be
large on the average. The real problem is to explain why so large a
portion of the error shows up statistically as bias rather than variance.
The variability in size of the errors observed in individual cases
stems from two sources. One is just the basic uncertainty that charac-
terizes all development work. The other is the difference in technolo-
gical advance sought in different systems. For systems incorporating
many new ideas and major improvements in performance the error
tends to be larger than for less ambitious projects.
Steps can and should be taken to improve development cost esti-
mates, especially to remove the bias. But even if this is done, signifi-
cant uncertainties remain to harass the analyst and the decision maker.
A more detailed analysis of the nature of these uncertainties and their
implications for research and development decision making is the
subject of the succeeding paper by Burton H. Klein.
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